Does Propaganda Have Intelligence Value?

Sheldon Greaves, Ph.D.

“You can discover what your enemy fears most by observing
the means he uses to frighten you.”
     — Eric Hoffer, The Passionate State of Mind (1954), p.131.

There are plenty of examples of using propaganda both to disorient or discourage enemies, and to rally friends and allies. The “dog whistle” by which someone uses carefully-chosen phrases that will resonate with listeners in a specific way is a classic example. Hannah Arendt offered some insightful observations about how Hitler used wild accusations against certain groups, which his opponents casually and smugly debunked. But Hitler’s objective was not to get people to believe something that wasn’t true. Rather, he was declaring his intentions towards certain parties. Donald Trump did the same thing starting with his early campaign speeches in which he claimed that immigrants coming across our southern border included a high proportion of criminals. This rhetorical lynchpin prepared the way for repressive and inhumane policies such as the Muslim ban, and the inhumane separation and imprisonment of immigrant families.

Additionally, it’s also clear in hindsight that both Hitler and Trump were spreading these themes to see which ones would resonate. Any society will have its biases and seams between different segments. Authoritarian leaders in particular make extensive use of divisive rhetoric in order to promote internal conflict that renders a population more amenable to control.

But how far can we go in using propaganda to ascertain the state of mind and intentions of the people spreading it? Can it communicate additional, unintended intelligence?

During the Second World War, the United States created the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS) special intelligence teams whose job was to analyze Axis news and propaganda broadcasts for intelligence content. For example, in 1943 Nazi propaganda began making reference to “retribution” just as the Germans were preparing to field their V-series weapons, the V-1 and V-2. While the American group and their British counterparts were not aware of the rocket weapons specifically, they were able to warn policymakers of increased German confidence in their ability to attack England. Mainly, however, the FBIS played a valuable role in the preparations for the invasion of Europe. By careful analysis and intuition, the FBIS “accurately assessed Germany’s shifting but steady progress toward the conviction that an invasion of southern Europe was imminent.”[1] A later assessment of over 500 FBIS reports against what actually happened historically revealed that over 80% of their analyses were correct.[2]

The current information climate is much different, obviously. We live in a permanent tsunami of information, much of it intended to confuse or deceive. In addition to the massive increase in media outlets, we also have far more competing agendas, not all of which are clear (or even coherent).

One of the effects of this multitude of sources is that it becomes difficult to distinguish “official” from “unofficial” sources, especially when many disinformation efforts are conducted by contractors or other third-parties. The Russians in particular make extensive use of these kinds of arrangements. Each actor is going to put their own particular twist on their messages in the service of a larger strategy. In the case of Putin’s Russia, the tactical objective is to create an environment in which facts are so hard to verify that people start to question reality itself (Sometimes called the “Gerasimov Doctrine”). Once they achieve this kind of strategic information warfare dominance, Putin and his allies can do whatever they want, confident that they will always be several steps ahead of anyone who tries to hold them accountable.

Another example of propaganda with intelligence value is when one group projects its own shortcomings or misdeeds onto an opposing group. This was explored in some depth by Sam Keen’s 1987 book Faces of the Enemy:Reflections on the Hostile Imagination[3], which was also made into an excellent documentary[4]. More recently, while one finds such projection in any political environment, projection within movement conservatism in the United States has reached dangerous levels of disassociation from reality.[5] This trend has only accelerated under the Trump administration.[6] It does, however, offer a window into not only what they fear, but what they are actually doing (or are about to be caught doing).


[1] Tadd Sholtis, “Nazi propaganda as intel: the methods of the FBIS” Words at War, 31 May 2019, https://www.wordsatwar.org/essays/2019/5/31/nazi-propaganda-as-intel-the-methods-of-the-fbis, accessed 20 March 2020.

[2] Alexander L. George, Propaganda Analysis: A Study of Inferences Made from Nazi Propaganda in World War II (Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson and Company, 1959), pp. 260-270.

[3] Frederic and Mary Ann Brussat, Review: Faces of the Enemy: Reflections on the Hostile Imagination by Sam Keen, Spirituality and Practice, https://www.spiritualityandpractice.com/books/reviews/view/8401

[4] Faces of the Enemy documentary: IMDb, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0097323/

[5] See Paul Waldman, “The Projection Party” The American Prospect, 27 August 2012, https://prospect.org/power/projection-party/

[6] Peter Beinart. “The Projection President” The Atlantic, 14 July 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/07/the-success-of-smoke-and-mirrors/533706/

Paul Siegel, “The Projector in Chief” Psychology Today, 29 July 2018, https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/freud-lives/201807/the-projector-in-chief


Leave a Reply

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.